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Impossible to Regulate? Social Media, Terrorists, and the
Role for the U.N.
Paulina Wu*
Abstract
The posting of journalist beheadings online and the arrests of numerous nationals
attempting tojoin terroristorganizationshave shown that terrorists are increasingly using social
media to spread ideology and recruit members. The popularity of soial media around the world
provides a huge potential audience for terrorist content. Unfortunately, because of states'
inabilio to cooperate, previous attempts to govern and police the Internet have failed. Any
regulation of the Internet or social media also raises collective action problems and baseline
definition issues. The U.N. is not in the position to pass a binding treay or convention because
use of social media by terroristsis harder to identif than other regulated areas of internet use.
Disagreementamong U.N. members on whether internetgovernance should be implemented by
the international communio also makes a treay unlikely. Despite these problems, this
Comment suggests that the U.N. still has an important role to play in the regulation of
terrorist content in social media. By taking a role as a coordinator between states, the U.N.
can create an effective monitoring regime that reduces the costs of internet governance and
promotes coordination between states.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorists have increasingly used social media as a recruiting and publicity
tool.' Social media is a recent innovation that allows individuals to "share
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content ([such] as videos)"
around the world.' It has several features advantageous to dissemination of
content: open access to users, the ability to reproduce and transmit information
quickly, and easy-to-use interfaces. 3 But these advantages also make social media
a useful tool for terrorists. In the last year, teenagers from the U.S., Europe,
Asia, and Australia joined terrorist organizations, recruited by social media
platforms. 4 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also used social media to
post the beheadings of journalists.' Due to the growing terrorist presence on
social media, regulation to limit and remove harmful content has the potential to
6
save lives.
Since the 1990s, the U.N. has recognized the threat of terrorists using the
Internet.7 However, regulation raises complicated questions of balancing an

I

See Gabriel Weimann, New Tennrism and New Media, WILSON CENTER COMMONS LAB 1 (2014),

2

available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-terrorism-and-new-media.
SocialMedia, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social / 20media.

3
4

5

6

7

See generaly Weimann, New Terrorism, supranote 1.
See, for example, Ben Brumfield, Officials: 3 Denver Girls Played Hooky from School and Tried to Join ISIS,
CNN (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.enn.com/2014/10/22/us/colorado-teens-syria-odyssey/;
Islamic State Crisis: "3,000 European Jihadists Join Fight," BBC NEws (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494; ISIS: Sjydny Mother Appeals to Four
Brothers Feared to
have Joined Militants, THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
16,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/nov/16/isis-sydney-mother-appeals-to-fourbrothers-feared-to-have-joined-militants; K.J. Kwon & Madison Park, Police: Korean Teen May Have
Fled to Syria to Join ISIS, CNN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/world/isiskorea-teenager.
See, for example, Isis Releases Video Showing Beheading ofAlan Henning, NBC NEws (Oct. 3, 2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-releases-video-showing-beheading-alanhenning-n208816.
See Pamela Brown, Terrorists' Most Dangerous Weapon is Social Media, CNN, (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://wwlp.com/2015/02/05/how-isis-uses-social-media; Craig Richardson, Time to Get Real on
Social
Media
Controls,
AUSTRALIAN
FINANCIAL.
REVIEW
(Nov.
25,
2014),
http://www.afr.com/p/technology/dme-to-getrealon-social-media-d3mU4lHykfUEhXWid
d5860; Deana Kjuka, When Terrorists Take to Social Media, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.theatlanfic.com/international/archive/2013/02/when-terrorists-take-to-socialmedia/273321; Ronan Farrow, Farrow: Why Aren't YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter Doing More to Stop
Terrorists from
1ndting
Violence?, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
10,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/1 0/farrow-why-arent- youtubefacebook-and-twitter-doing-more-to-stop-terrorists- from-inciting-violence.
See G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doe.A/RES/51/210 (Jan. 16, 1997), available
at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51 /ares5l-210.htm.
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individual's right to freedom of expression with the need to reduce terrorism's
toll on human life. Because social media transcends borders, commentators have
questioned whether the U.N. is the proper body to regulate internet and social
media abuse.8 In response, the U.N. has agreed that limiting terrorist social
media use is a pressing issue.' However, the U.N. is not in a position to pass a
convention or treaty covering internet or social media governance.
Two examples reflect the U.N.'s inability to regulate. In 2012, the U.N.
hosted the World Conference of International Telecommunications (WCIT) in
Dubai to discuss the issue of internet governance. Specifically, the Final Acts
recognized that "all governments should have an equal role and responsibility
for international Internet governance and for ensuring the stability, security, and
continuity of the existing Internet and its future development and of the future
internet."' 10 Despite the U.N.'s efforts, disagreement between members resulted
in only 89 out of 144 total countries signing the nonbinding Final Acts."
Countries such as the U.S., Canada, France, the U.K., and Germany did not sign
the treaty. With so many countries refusing to sign the Final Acts, the
conference shows how an international body is unlikely to resolve internet
governance. Another example is the Convention on Cybercrime, which regulates
cyberterrorism. In contrast to the WCIT, various states signed the Convention
on Cybercrime. As a result, there is a plausible argument that the U.N. could
pass a limited convention that only covers social media. However,
cyberterrorism and social media have fundamental differences in the harms they
create and the ability to identify violations. Cyberterrorism is easier to identify
because any intrusion into a private or public server is a violation. In contrast,
social media violations are at the most general level, only speech, which raises
the need to balance whether the individual speech is harmful enough to warrant
censorship or removal. These differences make a limited treaty on social media
implausible.
This Comment addresses the issues surrounding regulation of terrorism in
social media. Section II discusses the history of social media, its advantages, and

8

See Brendan Sasso, House to Examine Planfor United Nations to Regulate the Internet, THE HILL_ (May
25,
2012),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/229653-house-to-examine-plan-to-let-unregulate-internet.

9

See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Use of the Internet for Terrorist
Puposes 3 (2012).
international Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Conference on International

10

Telecommunications, Dec. 3-14, 2012, Final Acts of the World Conference on International
Telecommunications,
Resolution
Plen/3(e),
available
at
http://www.itu.int/en/wcit12/Documents/final-acts-wcit-i12.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Final Acts of the WCIT].
11

See ITU, World Conference on International Telecommunications, Dec. 3-14, 2012, Signatories of
the FinalActs: 89, availableat http://www.itu.int/osg/wcit- 12/highlights/signatories.html.
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its use by terrorists. Section III details the U.N.'s attempts to govern the Internet
in various ways, mostly through passing resolutions. The section also discusses
the right to freedom of speech and its tension with speech regulation. Section TV
then raises two of the predominant issues concerning regulation of internet
social media: collective action problems and a baseline definition of terrorism.
The inability of states to cooperate and agree on a definition for terrorism
contributes to why internet governance has failed in the past. Finally, Section V
argues that, despite the U.N.'s inability to enact formal regulations, it should still
take a role in regulating terrorist use of social media by acting as a coordinator
between states. As the largest and most legitimate international body, the U.N.
can use its resources to minimize transaction costs, which would make it easier
for states to cooperate. Furthermore, the U.N. could suggest the best methods
of combatting terrorist content. This Comment takes a preliminary step in this
direction by analyzing which definition of terrorism employed by Security
Council nations is best suited for an institutionalized international governance
regime. This Comment also notes that private actors cannot be completely
removed from the governance process. Instead, there must be coordination
between the U.N., member states, and private actors in order to successfully
curb terrorists' use of social media.
II. TERRORISM AND SOCIAL MEDIA: A RECENT PHENOMENON
Terrorism is rapidly increasing in frequency and magnitude around the
world. 2 In five years, the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
database grew from 540,000 names to 875,000.13 Since 2000, the number of
deaths from terrorism has grown from 3,361 in 2000 to 17,958 in 2013.14 Within
that period, there were over 48,000 terrorist incidents that claimed over 107,000
lives."5 Technology and terrorism are closely related because technology helps
terrorists reach more potential recruits, elevates the scale of destruction, and

12

13

14

15

U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE2, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2013 (Apr. 2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.
Mark Hosenball, Number of Names on U.S. Counter-terrorismDatabaseJumps, REUTERS (May 2, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/03/us-usa-security-databaseidUSBRE94200720130503 (listing numbers from 2008 and 2013, respectively). The TIDE
database is maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center and lists the names and
information of people whom U.S. authorities see as known, suspected, or potential terrorists. See
id.
Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2014, 2, available at
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Globa %2Terrorism%201ndex%2Report
%202014.pdf.
Id. at 12.
See
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increases the vulnerability of terrorist targets. 6 In the past few years, more
terrorist groups have started to use social media to recruit and proselytize,
harnessing terrorists' ability to quickly connect individuals from around the
world.
A.

Social Media and Its Advantages

Social media is a modern innovation that allows users to communicate
around the world in real time. Specifically, social media includes "forms of
electronic communication (such as Websites for social networking and
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content ([such] as videos).""7
For the purposes of this Comment, social media includes any internet platform
that allows communication through images, videos, or messages. The images,
videos, and messages are not only targeted towards specific individuals, but also
open to the public.' 8 Typical social media platforms include, but are not limited
to, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram.
Initially, social media was limited to online services that allowed users to
share files and access news and events.' 9 After 2002, social media grew into
online communities where users could connect through photos, online chatting,
and videos. 20 When Facebook and Twitter launched, social media boomed
because suddenly people could quickly post statuses or "tweet" messages as
soon as something happened. 21 As of 2014 in the U.S., 71 percent of adult
internet users use Facebook; 23 percent use Twitter; and 26 percent use
Instagram.22 In 2013, it was estimated that one in four people worldwide used
social networks, rising from 1.47 billion people in 2012 to 1.73 billion in 2013.23
By 2017, it is estimated the global social network audience will rise to 2.55

16

PAUL WILKINSON, TECHNOLOGY AND TERRORISM at 2-3

17

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 2.

18

Targeting the public as an audience is essential in a definition for social media because stating
otherwise would include private forms of communication, such as e-mail.

19

20

See
The Histoy
of Soial Networking
http://www.digitatrends.com/
features/the-history-of-social-networking.
See id.

21

See id.

22

Maeve Duggan et al., Social Media Update 2014, PE-w RESEARCH CENTER (an.

23

(1999).

DIGITAL

TRENDS

(Aug.

5,

2014),

9, 2015),

http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014.
Worldwide Sodal Network Users: 2013 Forecast and Comparaive Estimates, EMARKETER (Jun. 18, 2013),
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Social-Netwurking-Reaches-Nearly-One-Four-AroundWorld/1009976.
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billion.24 In little more than a decade, social media has become a dominant form
of communication that continues to grow worldwide.
Social media provides numerous advantages for communication, one of
which is its "overwhelming scope and generally open access."2 Most social
media platforms are free and accessible to anyone with an internet connection. A
person in the U.S. can post a message viewable almost instantaneously to
someone in Africa or Asia. In comparison to traditional online communities
where a user had to register in a forum with a particular subject matter, the
general audience for social media is vast. A tweet on Twitter can be seen by
millions of users from around the world. If an individual has a public Facebook
page, one wall post is available for everyone to see.
Because social media is electronic and practically instantaneous, it is "often26
used for breaking news or sharing information of immediate importance.
Social media can bring attention to global issues, keep actors accountable, and
facilitate greater scrutiny of the battlefield.27 For example, social media brought
considerable attention to the civil war in Libya in 201 1.28 Local rebels and
reporters used social media to disseminate news to the outside world and show
the extent of the war and the government's atrocities.29 In the case of Syria,
citizens have used social media to document government actions.3" Social media
also provided a means to acquire aid, as local villagers often raised awareness of
their villages' plight by posting on various online social media platforms.3 1 In the
2009 Iranian presidential elections, protestors turned to social media when the
government cracked down on traditional forms of expression.3 2 Social media
enabled protestors to coordinate peaceful demonstrations or give accounts of
24

Id

25

Anne Herzberg & Gerald M. Steinberg, THL 2.0: Is There a Role for Social Media in Monitoring and

26

Enforcement?, 45 ISR. L. REV. 493, 496 (2012).
Id.

27

See id. (describing how social media played a large part in providing transparency throughout

28

Gaddafi's capture in Libya).
See Neal Ungerleider, libya, Youtube, and the Internet, FAST

29

http://www.fastcompany.com/1731395/libya-youtube-and-internet.
See id.

COMPANY

(Feb. 24, 2011),

30

See, for example, Stephen Dinan, Syrians Use Social Media to Tell World: See Atrocitiesfor Yourself, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/2/syrians-use-socialmedia-to-tell-world-see-atrocit/?page= all (last visited May 1, 2015) (noting how, weeks after an
attack by the government, over 200 videos were posted online showing everything from victims
to munitions that were apparently used).

31

See Aryn Baker, For Syrians, Social Media is More Useful than the U.N. Security Cound, TIME (Mar. 24,
2014), http://time.com/35826/syria-u-n-soeial-media-yarmouk.
See Twitter Tells Tale of Iran Election, CBS NoWS (June 15, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/

32

news/twitter-tells-tale-o f-iran-election.
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violent clashes between protestors and police.33 In contrast to traditional news
websites where only reporters can post, social media provides a grassroots
mechanism for everyone to participate.
Finally, social media is effective because it is easy to use. Social media
requires "little effort on the part of followers or activists to engage with others
and share information."3' 4 In the case of reporting human rights violations, social
media minimizes the costs associated with documenting them: all it takes to post
is an internet connection and perhaps a camera. By providing a low-cost and
easy-to-use communication mechanism, social media enables users around the
world to connect and spread information.
B.

Terrorists' Use of Social Media

The most recent example of a terrorist group spreading its message on
social media is the release by ISIS of videos showing beheadings of foreign
journalists.3 5 Today, "about 90 [percent] of organized terrorism on the Internet
is being carried out through social media."36 Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations have "moved their online presence to YouTube, Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, and other social media outlets."3 Because at least one in
four people in the world use social media,38 terrorists' potential audiences are
vast.
Terrorists use social media for many of the same reasons that anyone else
does. It is "user-friendly, reliable, and free."'3 Consequently, terrorists use social
media platforms because "these channels are by far the most popular with their
intended audience, which allows terrorist organizations to be part of the
mainstream."' When a terrorist account is shut down, the cost of establishing a

36

See id.
Herzberg & Steinberg, supra note 25, at 496.
See Isis Releases Video, supra note 5.
Terrorist Groups Recruiting Through Social Media, CBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/
technology/terrorist-groups -recruiting-through-social -media- 1.1131053
(quoting
Gabriel
Weimann).

37

Weimann, supra note 1, at 1. For a detailed study on how terrorists use the Internet, see GABRIEL

33
34
35

WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET: THE NEW ARENA, THE NEW CHALLIINGES
38

See Worldwide Social Network Users, supranote 23.

39

Weimann, supra note 1,at 3.
Id.

40

(2006).
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new one is minimal.4 1 Furthermore, "social networking allows terrorists to reach
out to their target audiences and virtually 'knock on their doors'-in contrast to
older models of websites in which terrorists had to wait for visitors to come to
them."4 The U.S. State Department estimates there are about 12,000 foreigners
who have traveled to Syria from at least fifty different countries to fight with
insurgent groups, including ISIS. 43 Terrorists use Facebook as a "gateway to
extremist sites and other online radical content"; it acts as a "media outlet for
terrorist propaganda and extremist ideological messaging" and provides a
mechanism to "share operational and tactical information."" Twitter's real-time
functionality also allows terrorists to exchange urgent communications.4" The
U.S. Army has reported concerns that Twitter could become an effective
coordination tool for terrorists trying to launch militant attacks.46 YouTube is
used as a forum to post propaganda videos and recruit new individuals.47 Finally,
terrorists have used Instagram and Flickr to glorify Osama Bin Laden, for
example, or document the execution of hostages.4 8 In each of these cases, social
media's advantages are abused to help terrorists advance their illegal aims.

III. THE U.N. AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE
Any attempt to regulate social media implicates the right to freedom of
expression. Regulations must balance both the individual right to free speech
and the public interest in restricting terrorist activity. Because terrorism falls into
one of the exceptions to the general right to freedom of speech, the U.N. has
recognized that terrorists' social media use is an issue that requires addressing.4 9

41

42
43
44

45
46

See Hashtag Terror: How ISIS ManpeulatesSocial Media, ANTI-DFAMATION LEAGUE (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/isis-islamic-statesocial-media.html#.VM1 jcmjF9zU.
Weimann, supra note 1, at 3.
.See Francesca Trianni, Wy WesternersAre FightingforISIS, TIMiE (Sept. 5, 2014), http://time.com/
3270896/isis-iraq-syria-western- fighters.
Department of Homeland Security, Terrorist Use of Sodal Networking Facebook Case Study, PUBlC
INTEI.LIGENCE, (Dec. 5, 2010), http://pubicintelligence.net/ufouoes-dhs-terrorist-use-of-socialnetworking- facebook-case-study (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
See Weimann, supra note 1, at 8-9 (emphasizing how Syrian jihadists used Twitter to communicate
during the August 2013 U.S. airstrikes).
See 304TH MILITARY INTEJIGIENCL

BAITALION, AI, QAIDA-LIKE MOBILE DISCUSSIONS &

48

POTENTIAL CREATIVEI USES (Oct. 16, 2008), http://fas.org/irp/eprint/mobile.pdf.
An example is the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Islamic terrorist who posted 1,910 videos,
one of which had been viewed 164,420 times. See Weimann, supra note 1, at 11.
Weimann, supra note 1, at 13.

49

See UNODC, supra note 9, at 3.

47
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A.

Social Media and the Right to Freedom of Expression

As a preliminary matter, Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) recognizes the right to freedom of expression."0 Specifically,
"everyone has the right to freedom of opinion; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.""s The U.N. recognizes
that all individuals should express their thoughts and ideas in an open and
unrestricted environment. As a result, when anyone posts something on social
media, there is an expectation that this is protected speech. When speech is
protected, there is a high standard the government must meet in order to justify
censorship. Especially in countries like the U.S., where freedom of speech is
domestically protected, screening and removal of offensive social media raises
complicated issues over what should and should not be censored. For example,
even speech that expressly encourages violence is protected under the U.S.
Constitution unless it is likely that violence will imminently result.5 2 A further
complication of applying established free speech law to terrorist recruitment is
the concept of "imminent harm." If an individual is recruited into a terrorist
organization, is there an imminent harm that will result? This would seem
difficult to prove, because the foreseeability and certainty of harm could be too
remote to satisfy the imminence test.
While most of its member nations accord broad protection for free
expression, the U.N. recognizes that the right is not absolute. In Article 29(2) of
the UDHR, the exercise of freedom of expression is subject "to such limitations
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic
society." 3 As a result, speech that would call for the end of freedom of religion,
one of the other rights emphasized in the UDHR, would not be permitted. This
could be interpreted to apply to terrorist religious propaganda, but other than
restricting speech that contradicts UDHR rights, Article 29 is not clear on when
and how speech may be censored. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) has a stricter standard, under which state parties must
prohibit by law "any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that

51

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (Il) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(Il1), art.
19 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR.
Id.

52

Seegeneraly Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

53

UDHR, supra note 50, art. 29.

50
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constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence." 4 By requiring
states to take domestic action, the ICCPR has a stronger emphasis on curbing
harmful speech. Whereas the UDHR is not a binding treaty but a "common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," 5 the ICCPR is binding
and has 74 signatories and 168 parties.5 6 But since the ICCPR delegates most of
the rulemaking to its signatories, the general vagueness present in both
documents reflects the discretion given to states to implement and protect
freedom of speech.
B.

The U.N.'s Stance on Terrorists' Use of the Internet

The U.N. has recognized the dangers of terrorists using the Internet. In the
1990s, the U.N. called upon its member states to "note the risk
of terrorists using electronic or wire communications systems and networks to
carry out criminal acts and... to find means... to prevent such criminality and
to promote cooperation where appropriate."" The Security Council then asked
member states to increase international cooperation by exchanging information
regarding "use of communications technology by terrorist groups."5 8 In practice,
this has been harder to achieve than envisioned. 9 Nevertheless, in 2005 the
U.N. recognized the specific issue of terrorists exploiting the Internet:
Particularly in the age of popular social networking media, such as

Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr and blogging platforms, individuals...
publish, voluntarily or inadvertently, an unprecedented amount of sensitive
information on the Internet ....[S]ome of this information may be
60
misappropriated and used for the benefit of criminal activity.

Although social media regulation raises difficult questions of individual
rights and state sovereignty, the U.N. has recognized that terrorist abuse of
4

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 20 [hereinafter ICCPR].

55

UDHR, supra note 50, pmbl.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TRE-ATY COLLECTION (an. 5,

56

2015), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter
=4&lang=en. Notable signatories include the Russian Federation and the United States.
57

G.A. Res. 51 /210, supra note 7.

58

S.C. Res. 1373, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).

59

The U.S. and E.U. have generally agreed to share telecommunications to monitor terrorist
activity, but in the negotiation of several U.S.-E.U. information- sharing agreements, some E.U.
officials have expressed concern about whether the U.S. can guarantee a sufficient level of
protection for European citizens' personal data. In comparison to the U.S., the E.U. considers the
privacy of personal data a basic right and prohibits the transfer of such data to countries where
legal protections are deemed inadequate. See Kristin Archick, U.S.-E.U. Cooperation Against
Terrorism, CRS (Dec. 1, 2014).
UNODC, supra note 9, at 11.

60
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social media requires attention. Unfortunately, there are fundamental issues with
governing social media that make the U.N. unlikely to pass a successful
governance treaty.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING THE INTERNET AND
SOCIAL MEDIA
Despite its status as the foremost international legal body, the U.N. cannot
pass a convention that regulates the Internet, or even one that only regulates
social media. Besides free expression concerns, regulation of the Internet raises
collective action and baseline definition problems. The inability of the U.N. to
pass an efficacious convention was exemplified at the WCIT, where countries
were unable to agree on an international regulatory regime. Furthermore,
although a limited international convention worked in the case of
cyberterrorism, there are fundamental differences between social media and
cyberterrorism that make regulation of social media unlikely.
A.

Collective Action Problems: The Internet as a Commons

One obstacle facing a treaty that regulates the Internet is the fact that the
Internet is a global commons. On the international level, commons are areas
that "do not fall within the jurisdiction of any one country"; these areas "are
termed international commons or global commons."'" Because they do not fall
into any one jurisdiction, commons are difficult to regulate. Commons are
governed through a "mixture of regulations at multiple levels, including
multilateral treaty regimes, regional accords, and national regulations."62 In
general, the global commons consists of "international waters and airspace,
space, and cyberspace," which includes the Internet.6 3 The fact that private
actors own parts of the Internet is a further wrinkle. Indeed, some argue that
this makes the Internet a "pseudocommons."64 Regardless, even proponents of
the "pseudocommons" view concede that regulating the Internet raises
collective action problems.6"
Collective action problems arise in regards to resources held in common,
making it costly and difficult for diffuse actors to cooperate. Specifically,
collective action problems occur when multiple individuals are required to
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contribute to achieving a joint outcome, but it is difficult to exclude free-riders
who do not contribute but still enjoy the benefits.66 Because each actor wants to
incur the least cost, the result is for everyone to try to free-ride; eventually, no
one contributes even though it would be in their collective best interest to do
so." Every country would benefit from less harmful content posted by terrorists.
But because the Internet is a commons, no one country would want to
contribute to the cost of regulating. Instead, each country is incentivized to freeride.
B.

The Definition of Terrorism: A Baseline Issue

Another obstacle to regulating the Internet is difficulty in defining the
types of content subject to censorship. Although the U.N. recognizes that the
fundamental right of freedom of expression is limited when used to promote
violence or discrimination, much internet content is not clearly classified as one
or the other. Historically, attempts to define terrorism in international law have
failed,68 despite the fact that the U.N. has called for a comprehensive
international definition.69 The issue stems from determining what exactly is
"illegal" versus simply "objectionable" content.7" In many cases, there is tension
between defining actors as individuals acting for the sake of self-determination
and those acting as terrorists. Self-determination is the proposition that "every
people should freely determine its own political status and freely pursue its
economic, social, and cultural development."71 It is recognized in the ICCPR,
which emphasizes that "[a]l peoples have the right of self-determination." 2
However, states differ on whether there are any circumstances where selfdetermination justifies use of violence. In an unresolved U.N. debate between
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Pakistan and Morocco, Pakistan argued that self-determination constitutes the
most fundamental human right, while Morocco argued that self-determination
was obsolete.73 The debate is also relevant today, with Israel arguing that only
countries should determine the peace negotiation process, in contrast to the
State of Palestine's contention that "[t]he right of self-determination belongs to
all, and doesn't come after negotiations."74 If self-determination is a fundamental
right, then use of violence is justified. But if it is obsolete, then use of violence
can be defined as terrorism. Since both sides refuse to concede to the other, the
question of self-determination's primacy is unresolved.
Not only does resolving this dichotomy present a broad challenge for a
U.N. convention regulating terrorist use of social media, but the search for a
definition of terrorism also raises the issue of who should decide the definition of
illegal content. Should it be the U.N. Security Council? Should the definition be
subject to a vote in the General Assembly? What kind of consent is required in
order to agree on a definition? Should it be a majority or a supermajority? The
coordination and negotiation costs alone might explain the absence of a general
definition of terrorism in the more than seventy years since the U.N.'s creation.
This creates a dilemma: for there to be effective regulation to curb terrorists' use
of social media, there needs to be a definition of terrorism, but it is extremely
difficult to arrive at such a definition. Ifa government cannot easily identify the
illegal content, then the costs associated with determining whether the content
should be removed are too high to make regulation effective. There is also the
possibility of abuse of discretion-when the government is given the right to
punish terrorist activity, there is a risk that the government will punish critics
instead. Suggesting a baseline definition and analyzing the U.N.'s potential to
reduce coordination costs, Section V seeks to help resolve many of these
problems. By using its resources to monitor different governments, for example,
the U.N. might reduce the risk of abuse of discretion.
C.

The Failed Convention on Internet Governance: The
World Conference on International Telecommunications

The U.N.'s most recent attempt to regulate the Internet failed. As a
threshold matter, social media falls under the realm of "telecommunications"
and thus is monitored by the U.N. International Telecommunications Union
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(ITU). Established in 1865, the ITU is an impartial organization that coordinates
the operation of telecommunication networks.7 5 In 1989, the ITU developed the
International Telecommunications
Regulations "to facilitate [e] global
interconnection and interoperability of telecommunication facilities and to
promot[e] the harmonious development and efficient operation of technical
facilities, as well as the efficiency, usefulness and availability to the public of
international telecommunication services." 76 There were few subsequent
developments until 2012, when the ITU came together in Dubai to pass a new
set of regulations.
The World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT),
held in Dubai from December 3 to 14, 2012, resulted in the ITU Final Acts,
which focused on providing an international network for telecommunications.7 7
Of the 144 states that attended, only 89 states signed the Final Acts. 8
Specifically, the conference split into two sides-Russia, China, and developing
countries such as the Ivory Coast and Kazakhstan signed the Final Acts, while
Western countries such as the U.S., Canada, France, the U.K., and Germany did
79

not.

The biggest point of contention was Resolution Plen/3, which recognized
that all governments should have an "equal role and responsibility for
international internet governance and for ensuring the stability, security and
continuity of the existing internet and its future development."8 Although it was
not explicitly mentioned in the talks, this notion of equal responsibility poses
issues about the costs of monitoring terrorist activity. If all governments should
have an equal role, does that mean all governments must equally share the costs
to maintain an adequate internet platform? What about Western countries,
which use social media more than other developing countries? Should countries
that have a greater terrorist presence, such as countries in the Middle East, pay
more for the costs of regulation? Even without addressing these concerns, the
U.S. perceived the resolution as a threat to the open internet:
The United States has consistently maintained that the Internet should not
have been mentioned in the proposed treaty, which dealt with technical
matters like connecting international telephone calls, because doing so could
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lead to curbs on free speech and replace the existing,
bottom-up form of
81
Internet oversight with a government-led model.

This view contrasted with that of Russia, who "proposed ...that the treaty
be revised to give each country control over the Internet within its borders,
including domain names, addresses, and other key engineering resources. ' 82 The
polarization at the conference between the U.S. and Russia, therefore, seems to
stem from disagreement over freedom of expression. Historically, the U.S. has
taken a strong view of the need to protect free speech, even in cases of speech
that promote violence or make false statements of fact.83 By contrast, Russia has
consistently minimized the importance of freedom of speech, and recent reports
from Russia have highlighted an erosion of free speech rights, particularly with
respect to speech against the government.8 4
Because fifty-five countries did not sign the ITU Final Acts, many have
criticized the treaty as a failure. Specifically, one scholar has called the WCIT the
"beginning of a devolution that ultimately leads to multiple Internets, with
varying degrees of freedom of speech and other human rights respected."8 5
Some voices criticize the ITU itself, noting that the "ITU is the chosen vehicle
for regimes for whom the free and open Internet is seen as an existential threat"
and the "past and future role of the ITU has traditionally been to foster
corruption, monopoly, to facilitate surveillance and censorship."8 6 Although it is
unclear whether the ITU is a vehicle for authoritarian regimes, the WCIT does
show that the fundamental differences between member states likely make any
comprehensive treaty impossible.
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D.

The Implausibility of a Limited Treaty: Cyberterrorism
and Social Media, an Imperfect Analogy
1. The Convention on Cybercrime: a success story.

Cyberterrorism is a "premeditated, politically motivated attack against
information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in
violence against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine
agents."8 Independent hackers or government-sanctioned hackers use
cyberterrorism to attack governments or private entities. 88 Throughout the years,
numerous cyberterrorism regulations have passed in various international
forums. As early as 1990, the Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders called for member states "to intensify efforts to
combat computer crime by modernizing their national criminal laws and
procedures, improving computer security and prevention measures, and
promoting the development of a comprehensive international framework of
guidelines and standards for preventing, prosecuting, and punishing computerrelated crime in the future."89 By 2002, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) passed the Guidelines for Security
Systems, recognizing the need for greater cybersecurity protections.9"
In 2004, the Council of Europe enacted the Convention on Cybercrime,
the most important international regulation of cyberterrorism to date. The
Convention requires parties to enact substantive and procedural legislation to
criminalize certain computer crimes. 91 The U.S. was one of many countries that
signed the Convention. Signatories agreed to adopt legislative measures that
made hacking a criminal offense and to "co-operate with each other, in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through the application of
relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal
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matters."9 2 In 2011, NATO adopted the New Strategic Concept, which focuses
on the threat of cyberterrorism.93 The New Strategic Concept aims to bring all
of NATO's members under a centralized cyber-protection system to defend and
recover from cyberattacks.94
Even though countries faced similar issues of collective action," the fight
against cyberterrorism resulted in international consensus. The Convention
required members to cooperate "to the widest extent possible" and extended
"not only to crimes established in the treaty, but also to the collection of
electronic evidence whenever it relates to a criminal offense."9 6 An important
provision mandated that parties to the Convention participate in the Cybercrime
Convention Committee, which meant that countries not involved in the drafting
of the original treaty would still be involved in the development of future
international cybercrime standards.97 Countries were also given the option to
refuse certain requests, provided that the request interfered with a country's
"sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests."98 Although the
ability to opt out weakens the applicability of the Convention, countries are
more likely to sign an international framework when they reserve their own
sovereignty. Accordingly, there is a plausible argument that a limited treaty on
social media could gain more momentum than a comprehensive treaty on
internet governance.
2. Fundamental differences between cyberterrorism and social media.
The similarities between cyberterrorism and terrorists' use of social media
give hope to the idea that an international treaty regulating social media is
possible. Even though the WCIT failed to govern the Internet, the U.N. could
possibly pass a limited treaty on social media. Cyberterrorism and social media
are similar because both use the Internet in a harmful way: cyberterrorists steal
information, while terrorists recruit and spread terror. Both require monitoring
and coordination, and implicate concerns about internet regulation as a whole.
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However, the fundamental differences between social media and
cyberterrorism make a limited treaty on social media unlikely. Cyberterrorism is
easier to identify-when anyone hacks or threatens to hack into a computer or
network, it falls under widely accepted definitions of cyberterrorism.9 9 As a
result, cyberterrorism is inherently illegal while general use of social media is not.
This is to say that the costs of identifying cyberterrorism are much lower; there
is no question when cyberterrorism is committed. On the other hand, there are
grey areas when individuals use social media to promote terrorist causes. An
individual's right to post on social media raises freedom of speech issues,
perhaps more directly than the typical instance of cyberterrorism does. If an
individual posts that he or she thinks the government should be overthrown by
Al Qaeda, does that constitute promotion of terrorism? If an individual posts on
Twitter that he supports ISIS, is he a terrorist? It is much harder to determine
who is a terrorist in the social media context than in the cyberterrorism context.
Furthermore, cyberterrorists tend to be sophisticated hackers with
advanced understandings of technology, whereas almost anyone can use social
media. The number of potential violators in the social media realm is much
higher than in cyberterrorism. Finally, the link between the harm and the activity
in cyberterrorism is much more direct. A cyberterrorist violates the privacy of a
government or private entity, which creates a clear and imminent harm to the
organization or individual. In the context of social media, this is less clear. There
is no question that social media can lead to harmful consequences: people
joining terrorist organizations, beheading others, and then posting shocking
images or videos. But the strength of causation is weaker. Can social media be
blamed for someone wanting to join ISIS? It is possible the person would have
joined regardless from seeing stories about the organization on the news. The
same could be said about beheading videos; instead of posting the video on
social media, ISIS could send the video to news agencies. Due to these
differences, a limited treaty on social media would not likely encounter the broad
support the Convention on Cybercrime enjoyed.
V. THE U.N.'s ROLE IN SOCIAL MEDIA GOVERNANCE: AN
IDEAL FACILITATOR
The U.N. may not be able to pass a treaty, but it can coordinate regulatory
efforts between states and provide valuable information. With its resources and
legitimacy as the leading international body, the U.N. can foster cooperation to
hinder terrorists' social media use. By spreading more widely the costs regulatory
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initiatives would impose on private actors, the U.N. can identify the best
methods to resolve this issue.
A.

The Insufficiency of Private Regulation

Although private actors play an important role in monitoring the Internet,
successful monitoring requires the presence of state actors. Some argue that
private regulation is sufficient, because companies like Facebook or YouTube
can regulate the Internet by using filtering techniques and allowing users to flag
objectionable content."° However, there are issues with private regulation that
make monitoring of internet content particularly difficult.
First, the practical difficulties of filtering and zoning internet information
make it extremely tedious for private actors to monitor the Internet. Facebook
and YouTube are large companies, but the resources required to monitor the
Internet are enormous. 10 1 In these cases, the financial costs associated with
monitoring are extremely high, disincentivizing voluntary monitoring of user
content.
In addition, there are social costs to monitoring the Internet. An
anonymous senior official at a social media company noted that "[o]ne person's
terrorist is another person's freedom fighter," thus making regulation of content
"not something we'd want to do." 102 Although social media companies
recognize that terrorist content should be removed, stricter regulation could
"ruin" social media platforms by deterring normal users from posting
objectionable but non-extremist content."0 3 This type of "chilling effect"
prevents speakers from exercising their rights to expression, which, although
objectionable, may provide valuable contributions to public discourse and
debate."0 4 In these cases, social media companies fear that they will "create a
standard for everyone that is in response to [a] small minority, [where] by
creating that standard [the companies] then ruin the thing that [they have]
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created." ' 5 Further, when internet monitoring is completely in the hands of a
private market, there may be a gap between private interests and the public
interest of promoting free discourse.16 Specifically, the private actor may
prioritize its own interests over those of the public." 7 Another complication is
the fact that private actors face a legitimacy issue in regulating internet content.
In the face of terrorist content, which raises security and free speech issues, are
private actors competent to decide which content should be removed? The
combination of financial and social costs makes it unfeasible to depend solely on
private actors to regulate terrorist content.
B.

Solving the Collective Action Problem: Principles of
Effective Monitoring and Their Application to the U.N.

The U.N. is in the best position to coordinate between state governments
to monitor the use of social media by terrorists. With its resources and
legitimacy as an international body, the U.N. can best solve the collective action
problem internet regulation poses. It can also oversee state governments and
ensure that there are no abuses of discretion. The U.N. can solve the collective
action problem in five ways: creating well-defined boundaries, ensuring
proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, making collective choice
arrangements, monitoring for violations, and implementing a system of
graduated sanctions."0
To solve a collective action problem, there must first be well-articulated
boundaries that define who is and is not in the group. If a group can determine
its own membership-including those who agree to use the resource according
to their agreed-upon rules and excluding those who do not agree to these
rules-then it makes an important first step toward limiting access and
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developing greater trust and reciprocity." 9 In the case of the U.N., membership
is clearly established, and members "confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." ' 10 Thus,
when the U.N. coordinates between states, clear boundaries demonstrate which
states are obligated to listen to its suggestions.
The second important principle for overcoming collective action problems
is consistency between distribution of costs and benefits,"' something the U.N.
is well-placed to ensure. The benefits of a coordinated effort to regulate social
media would be less terrorist propaganda and recruiting. The costs would be
those associated with monitoring and participating in the governance of social
media. The U.N. has stressed the importance of limiting terrorists' internet use,
which facially suggests its willingness to ensure a proportional distribution of
benefits and costs." 2 By coordinating across borders and offering its resources
to monitor violations, the U.N. could help members enjoy the benefits of a safer
3
internet environment. 1
An effective system would also require collective choice arrangements,
where "most of the individuals affected by a resource regime may participate in
enacting their rules. This enables regimes to tailor rules to local circumstances
and to devise rules considered fair by participants."" 4 For instance, the General
Assembly is the "main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of
the [U.NI."" Because every country has one vote, every member has a voice in
deliberating on social media regulations. If one country is abusing its discretion,
either by curbing dissent or favoring certain countries' content over others," 6
the General Assembly can collectively debate the issue. Not only does this take
advantage of the wealth of expertise each country can provide, but it also makes
regulation more legitimate. Particularly in this area, the U.N. is more effective
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than the ITU. By allowing each member to deliberate, the U.N. quells concerns
that any regulatory regime is being abused by countries aiming to curb free
speech.
Overcoming the collective action problem also requires monitoring.1 1 In
order to minimize the risk of free-riding, an effective monitoring system must
identify violations and violators. In the case of the U.N., a special committee
could be created to monitor social media use. " 8 U.N. members can also file
complaints, which would create an effective system to supplement government
and private efforts to regulate harmful content. An independent expert could
also be appointed to identify violations and act on individual cases.119
Finally, the U.N. is the ideal venue to implement a system of graduated
sanctions. Graduated sanctions are helpful because the first punishment notifies
the individual or nation of public scrutiny, but the capability to escalate sanctions
allows the regime to warn members of the costs of failing to conform.' ° In the
case of regulating terrorists' social media use, punishment would be directed
towards countries that abuse their discretion by clamping down on legitimate
criticism and expression or failing to screen terrorist content. Sanctions could
range from warnings to economic sanctions and, in extreme cases, even to
military intervention.'
The U.N. is particularly equipped at implementing
sanctions because of its broad reach-"[i]nternational principles contained in
treaties such as the U.N. Charter and in customary law can be applied to nonstate actors, as well as to states, to maintain international peace and security and
minimize the potential for international conflict."' 122 In comparison to other
agencies or private actors, the U.N. is in a better position to coordinate an effort
between countries to regulate terrorist social media.
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See Ostrom, supra note 108, at 14.

An example would be the United Nations Human Rights Council, which monitors global human
rights violations.
119 Special procedures, "special rapporteurs" (as individuals), or working groups are used to advise on
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human rights violations. Because regulation of terrorist expression raises free speech concerns, a
special rapporteur could be created to specifically address these violations. For a discussion of the
role of special procedures, see Office of the High Commission of Human Rights, Special Procedures
of the Human Rights Coundl, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited April 6, 2015).
See Ostrom, supra note 108, at 14-15.
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It is important to note that U.N. military intervention is rarely pursued, even in response to well-

publicized violations of UDHR rights. Two examples include the Rwandan genocide and the
atrocities committed in Serbia. For a discussion of the UN's reluctance to intervene, see Max
Boot, Paving the Road to Hell The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March/April
2000).
122 Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereign~y and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative Framework for
BalancingLegal Rights, 26 EMORY INT'l L. REV. 825, 841 (2012).
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C.

A Preliminary First Step: Identifying the Best Definition
of Terrorism

The failure of the U.N. to pass a convention on point does not preclude
the possibility of coordination efforts. Although each State has its own methods
to deal with terrorist use of social media, some methods work better than others.
Social media use by terrorists is a new phenomenon, and the U.N. can be a
useful resource in creating and fostering an effective monitoring system. The
first step the U.N. can take is to suggest the definition of terrorism best suited to
differentiating between valuable free expression and terrorist recruiting. By
providing a suggestion, not a requirement, each State's sovereignty is preserved.
Although non-binding recommendations may not be as effective or enforceable
as a binding obligation, this approach makes it more likely that states will be
open to some form of internet governance.' 23 As a preliminary attempt at this
approach, this Comment looks at the definitions of terrorism used by each
member of the Security Council, and analyzes which definition is best suited to a
social media regulatory regime.' 24
1. The U.S.
Multiple U.S. statutes define terrorism. One definition describes terrorism
as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."' 25 U.S. law
defines international terrorist acts' 26 with reference to three characteristics:
[1] violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a

criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States
or of any State; [2] [an intention] (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and [3] [acts] occur[ing] primarily outside the

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries
123

For an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of hard law (binding) versus soft law (non-

124

binding), see generally Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, andAntagonistsin InternationalGovernance,94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010). In general, softlaw instruments are easier and less costly to negotiate, impose lower sovereignty costs on states,
provide greater flexibility, and respond better to diverse perspectives. In the area of social media
regulation, which is relatively new and uncertain and where nations have contrasting views
towards the best way to proceed, non-binding regulation is much more likely to succeed than
binding law.
This Comment focuses on the five Security Council members as a starting point, as their practices
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are likely good proxies for countries that actively respond to terrorist attacks.
22 U.S.C 5 2656f(d)(2) (2005).
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This is in contrast to domestic terrorism, which is defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2331(5)

(2001).

Vol. 16 No. 1

Sodal Media, Terrorists,and the UnitedNations

in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum[.] 127
Although having an under-inclusive definition of terrorism is a legitimate
concern, the U.S.'s definition is fragmented. By defining terrorism differently in
multiple statutes, it is unclear which definition is proper in different
circumstances. The creation of binding but ambiguous obligations violates the
notion that statutes should provide fair notice to citizens. 128 If this definition
were adopted to determine what types of social media content are considered
"terroristic," it would be too broad to implement effectively. In addition, by
defining international terrorism to require three prongs, the definition risks
being under-inclusive of terrorist behavior. Having separate prongs and a
conjunctive test may address the concern that the definition is too broad, but the
number of prongs must be balanced in order to be detailed but cover the
conduct at issue.
2. The U.K.
The U.K. defines terrorism as the "use or threat of action ... designed to
influence the government or to intimidate the public, and the use or threat is
made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause,"
and:
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the
action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic
system. 129
The U.K.'s definition is more inclusive than the U.S.'s. Unlike the U.S.
definition, which requires satisfaction of all three prongs, the U.K. only requires
"use or threat of action" designed to "influence the government or intimidate
the public," made for the purposes of "advancing political, religious or
ideological cause," which involves or causes the listed harms.13 The harms are
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18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2001).
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For a discussion of the fair notice doctrine, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999)
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("'mhe purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or
her conduct to the law.").
Terrorism Act, 2000, sec. 1(2) (U.K.).

130 Id.

Summer 2015

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

also defined broadly, including violence, threats, risks, and interference. 3' As a
result, the U.K. definition covers more harmful content. Although it is not
under-inclusive, its breadth creates a risk of abuse of discretion.
3. France.
France defines terrorism as acts "intentionally committed by an individual
entity or by a collective entity in order to seriously disturb law and order by
intimidation or by terror."' 132 The French Criminal Code also lists specific
terrorist acts, such as "[a]ttempted murder, assault, kidnapping, hostage-taking
on... all means of transport, theft, extortion, destructions ...the production,
sale, import and export of explosives, [etc.].", 3 3
French law defines terrorism broadly, then lists specific acts that can be
prosecuted. The specific acts prevent the definition from becoming overinclusive. In comparison to the U.S. and U.K. definitions, the French definition
seems to be less susceptible to abuse of discretion because it does not have
language such as "threat" or "risk." Although there are many instances of
terrorists threatening to use violence, including "threat" or "risk" in a definition
raises freedom-of-speech concerns as applied to social media. An individual
could voice a threat but not take any substantial steps toward acting on the
threat. Having a list of specific acts limits the French government from
prosecuting those that are voicing objectionable, albeit non-terroristic, opinions.
4. Russia.
Russia defines terrorism as "the ideology of violence and the practice of
influencing the adoption of a decision by public authorities, local selfgovernment bodies, or international organizations connected with frightening
13 4
the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions."'
Without any other elaboration of the term "terrorism," Russia has the
broadest definition of all the Security Council members. As an authoritarian
government, Russia mainly depends on the Roskomnadzor, a federal agency
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Loi 96-647 du 22 Juillet 1996 A Renforcer la Repression du Terrorisme et des Atteintes aux
Personnes Dpositaires de L'Autorit6 Publique ou Charg~es d'une Mission de Service Public [Law
96-647 of July 22, 1996 to Strengthen the Suppression of Terrorism and Attacks on Persons
Vested with Public Authority or Charged with a Public Service Mission] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE JO.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], art. 421-1, translated in SusAN
TIEFENBRUM, DECODING INTERNATIONAL LAW: SEMIOTICS AND THES HUMANITIEs 97 (2010).
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134 Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 35-FZ of March 6, 2006 on Counteraction against
Terrorism art. 3 (June 2006) (version published by the Council of Europe).
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established to monitor the Internet and media activities.13 Consequently,
Russia's definition is likely too broad for other countries to adopt. The risk of
abuse of discretion is much higher with Russia's definition than with the French
or U.K. definitions. There are numerous voices of concern over Russia's
definition already, 3 6 making it implausible for the General Assembly ever to
approve the definition, let alone to suggest it to any other countries without
widespread objection.
5. China.
China does not have a statutory definition of terrorism. The only definition
appears in a draft bill, under which terrorist acts were "defined as those acts
which are intended to induce public fear or to coerce state organs or
international organisations by means of violence, sabotage, threats or other
tactics.""'n Since 2011, there has been no subsequent legislation to pass the bill.
However, China did pass a resolution elaborating on guidelines to define
terrorism.138 Terrorist activities are those
that severely endanger society that have the goal of creating terror in society,
endangering public security, or threatening state organs and international
organizations and which, by the use of violence, sabotage, intimidation, and
other methods, cause or are intended to cause human casualties, great loss
to property, damage to public infrastructure, and chaos in the social order,
as well as activities that incite, finance, or assist the implementation of the
above activities through any other means.139
Although China does not have a statutory definition, its guidelines
elaborate details that make China's definition less susceptible to abuse than
Russia's for the purposes of regulating social media. China's definition is
directed towards acts that "endanger society," which could be construed very
broadly. A narrower definition of terrorism is more likely to find support
because it excludes more issues of contention, making abuse of discretion less
problematic." 4 The need for China's government to focus on stability may
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See Sharyl N. Cross, Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and Sodal Media: Exploring
Prospectsfor U.S.-Russia Cooperation Beyond the 'Reset", 6 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 1, 14 (2013).
See id. at 14-15 (noting how Russia's internet community, academics, and activists have all
expressed concerns that the creation of an Internet "blacklist" could lead to widespread
censorship).
China Draft Bill Defines TerrorismAmid 'Real Threat, BBC (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-pacific-I 5444081.
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explain the country's focus on the dangers terrorists pose to society.' Because
most other countries do not have a one-party system, China's definition would
be difficult to apply to more politically pluralistic nations.
6. Who has it best? France.
One of the greatest hurdles for regulating terrorist use of the Internet is
arriving at an accepted definition of terrorism itself.142 Among the definitions of
terrorism each Security Council country has adopted, the most effective is
France's definition. With a broad definition followed by detailed acts, it is the
least likely to encounter resistance from other countries. To regulate social
media, a broad definition is required in order to cover a variety of contexts.143
Although countries that particularly value freedom of speech like the U.S. would
be wary of a broad definition, there are substantial checks that the U.N. can
provide to help curtail abuses of discretion.
First, the U.N. provides a forum for debate where members can vote to
determine whether a warning or economic sanctions are appropriate. Even if a
country adopts the recommended definition, it may be subject to punishment if
it does not use the definition appropriately. Second, the U.N. has vast resources
to call on to solve the collective action problem, so it can spread the costs of
monitoring social media violations and ensure that the definition is not misused.
To determine misuses, the most plausible mechanism would be to create a
Special Rapporteur or supervise a complaint system where U.N. members can
vote to determine when punishments are appropriate. Third, since members are
able to report to the U.N., there are adequate protections to keep governments
from using the terrorist definition to punish dissenters. An effective monitoring
regime and complaint system will allow countries most concerned with
violations to keep an eye on and report possible violators. The complaint system
can also be open to reports by citizens-although this may open the door to a
huge influx of complaints, the sorting of which would be extremely expensive.
Even though the U.N. lacks strict enforcement mechanisms, such as a police
force, a naming-and-shaming system could at least raise the reputation costs of
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See Gary King et al., How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective
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Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2013) (finding that the Chinese government tends to censor
speech that endangers stability by proposing collective action, rather than speech that criticizes
the government).
See generaljy Saul, supra note 68.
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Limited definitions would raise the issue of whether a video is threatening but a photograph is
not, whether a tweet directed to recruit individuals would technically be a means of violence, etc.
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abusive behavior. 1" If a State adopted the recommended definition but was
using it to suppress dissent, the U.N. could raise a global outcry to shame it back
into compliance.' 45
D.

The U.N. Must Also Coordinate with Private Actors

Although private actors alone are insufficient for successful regulation, they
must be included in the regulatory process. Historically, the U.N. has worked
with private companies in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in order to
promote human rights, fair labor practices, environmental protection, and
anticorruption.' 46 A significant example is the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), one of the specialized agencies of the U.N. created to
"encourage creative activity, to promote the protection of intellectual property
throughout the world." 141 WIPO has successfully negotiated treaties to protect
patents, copyrights, and trademarks worldwide.'48 In The Global Innovation
Index, published by WIPO, the organization noted that
PPPs help governments become more inventive by creating a space outside
the government structure that allows innovation to flourish. PPPs help to
inject a broader set of skills and talents, as well as a more diligent and
responsive work culture into the government machinery and to create a
49
solid foundation for innovative thinking and creativity.
WIPO's success in protecting intellectual property indicates that private
companies are willing to participate and take a role in the regulation process.
In the context of social media regulation, outside groups can provide
expertise, such as "corporations like Google; international nonprofit
corporations; organizations like the Internet Society, the Internet Engineering
Task Force, and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
144
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unf website/PDF/understand-pubic-private-partner.pdf.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, Preamble, para. 2.
For a discussion of \WIPO's contribution to the protection of intellectual property, see generally
Gerald J. Mossinghoff and Ralph Oman, The World Intellectual Property Organization:a United Nations
Success Stoy, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 691 (1997).
Louis Witters, Revital Maron & Kurt Steinert, The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving
Innovation, in THE GLOBAL. INNOVATION INDEX 2012 (Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012).

Summer 2015

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

(ICANN), which develops the Internet's technical protocols and standards; and
computer security experts." ' States must be aware that any regulation of social
media will directly affect private industry, risking infringement on free
enterprise. However, private social media platforms are incentivized to
cooperate with the U.N. because the U.N. can spread expensive monitoring
costs. Furthermore, working with the U.N. to remove terrorist content might
improve a company's standing in the court of public opinion; private companies
do not want to be blamed for allowing terrorists to use their platforms.'
Instead of removing content on their own, private companies will be legitimized
by openly cooperating with state governments.5 2 Of course, the risk still exists
that private actors will limit too much content or fail to limit content at all. But
because the U.N. can spread the cost of monitoring, the increased availability of
resources can mean more detailed review. This results in closer scrutiny of
whether content should be removed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment has been to identify the proper role for the
U.N. in the regulation of terrorist social media. Although unable to pass a
convention on internet or social media governance, the U.N. could still
coordinate a successful international response to terrorists proselytizing to
disaffected youth on the Internet-a strategy that has recently become more
effective and produced horrific consequences. Social media provides important
advantages in the new age of technology; it allows broad access around the
world, fast reproduction and transmission of information, and is low-cost and
easy to use. The U.N.'s attempt to address this issue at the WCIT fostered
disagreement between states and produced a treaty that did not bind some of the
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biggest actors in the international arena. To curb terrorist use of social media,
there should be cooperation between countries, specifically those with the most
advanced social media infrastructure and those most likely to be the targets of
social-media recruitment. Any attempt to regulate social media must address
collective action problems and provide a baseline definition of terrorism. Private
actors cannot regulate terrorist content sufficiently on their own but have shown
a willingness to cooperate with the U.N. in other aspects of domestic regulation.
There are also risks that governments will use social media regulation to curb
dissent, and any implementation of a governance structure risks favoring certain
countries over others. To resolve these issues, the U.N. should take a role as a
coordinator and facilitate cooperation between all of its member states.
Although this does not eliminate the possibility of debate between countries, it
improves the current situation where there is no coordination at all. Taking a
role as a coordinator respects state sovereignty, but also reduces transaction
costs. By using its resources to identify abuses of power and determine the best
methods to regulate terrorist use, the U.N. can successfully help regulate
terrorist use of social media.
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